We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labor and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the same way in social welfare. We determine first-and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement ages. Then we introduce the possibility of testing that can sort out disabled workers from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later retirement for the disabled than for the leisure-prone. In that case, the disabled are compensated by higher benefits.
Introduction
More precisely, we introduce a testing procedure that reveals individuals health status so that the disabled can be identified. We show that such control can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. However, we also show that it is not optimal to test all applicants. To some extent the solution without audit looks very much like what is observed in a number of countries that experience a clear abuse of disability insurance programs, with the consequence of low labor force participation by elderly workers and erosion of disability benefits for budgetary reasons. The solution with audit looks like what was prevailing at the start of social security programs and what a number of economists are now advocating to increase the age of retirement: stop the use of disability insurance as an early retirement program. 1 We consider two objective functions. The first one is Paretian, and it gives more weight to the utility of the disabled than to that of the leisure-prone individuals. We follow the approach of Fleurbay and Maniquet (1998) and Boadway et al. (2002) who study the issue of redistribution when agents differ not only in their ability, but also in some other characteristic for which they are responsible. These authors give more weight to individuals who are poor because of low ability than to individuals who are poor because of their preference for leisure. In the second specification, the social planner does not use the preferences of the leisure-prone individuals as such, but impose on them some other preferences for leisure, specifically those of the healthy individuals. This paternalistic approach is clearly not Paretian; it is in line with the concept of "demerit" goods, namely goods that tend to be overconsumed in a market economy because of negative externalities. Recently, the word "sin goods" has been introduced with the same meaning; see O'Donoghue and Rabin (2005) . Alcoholic beverages, drugs and cigarettes are typical demerit or sin goods, towards which the social planner adopts a paternalistic view. This paper builds on our earlier work. The underlying modelling of individual labor supply decisions and choice of retirement age is closely inspired by Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004a) . Concerning disability policy design, including audits, the first part of the current paper is an extension of 1 Auditing disabled workers is not the only solution to the problem at hand. We can expect that the leisure-prone and the disabled individuals could be distinguished if, instead of focusing on their disposable income we would look at their consumption vector. We can indeed trust that they don't have the same consumption pattern: the leisure-prone individuals likely consume relatively more leisure goods and the disabled ones spend more on health care. If this is the case, indirect taxes and subsidies can be used to sort out the two types and achieve a more desirable outcome. This is the line adopted by Marchand et al. (2003) . In this paper, we do not consider the possibility of indirect taxation. Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004b) . The current paper, however, has two crucial differences. The first, and most fundamental original feature of the current setting is the presence of the two indistinguishable types (namely the disabled and the leisure-prone individuals).
2 This feature makes it necessary to resort to testing, as the traditional self-selection constraints do not allow authorities to discriminate between the disabled and the leisure-prone workers. The second difference from our previous work lies in the specification of the objective function: the earlier paper considers only a utilitarian solution, while here we consider two alternative specifications. The first one is welfarist, and thus Paretian, but not utilitarian as we give different weights to the different types. The alternative specification is paternalistic and non-welfarist. It means that the planner gives the leisure-prone individuals the same disutility for effort as that of the hard-working individuals.
The results we obtain have to be assessed and interpreted along with those of our earlier papers. Roughly speaking, Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004a,b) have shown (i) that distortions towards early retirement are unavoidable in a second-best setting under asymmetric information when the retirement system is used (in part) to redistribute incomes within a generation and (ii) that audits which test for health status may be an effective way to mitigate these distortions (and enhance welfare). The current paper allows us to distinguish more explicitly between retirement and disability insurance, a distinction that become crucial when leisure-prone and truly disabled coexist (and cannot be easily distinguished). Within the current economic, demographic and budgetary context, many authors have advocated decreasing the generosity of social insurance programs for those who "abuse" the system. However, for those who are truly disabled or unemployed, such a reform necessarily implies lower benefits. From a public finance viewpoint, the reform works; from a social welfare viewpoint, it may be catastrophic. Our current paper shows that such an outcome can be avoided by introducing or strengthening the audit and control techniques, which allows the sorting of leisure-prone workers and true disabled individuals. Thus, it may be possible at the same time to keep the disability benefits at a sufficiently high level, while inducing the non-disabled to work longer.
We have already mentioned papers showing that disability insurance and other programs are standard routes for exiting the labor force before the normal retirement age. In addition, other papers specifically deal with disability insurance. In the United States is a lot of work on the interaction between disability insurance and the labor market. Parsons (1980) in a widely quoted paper shows that the social security program explains a large fraction of the postwar decline in prime-age labor force participation. This study was followed by several ones that never disputed the disincentive effects of disability insurance but questioned their magnitude [see e.g. Bound (1989) , Parsons (1980 Parsons ( , 1991 and Gruber (2000) ]. This literature demonstrates two issues: one concerns the number of truly disabled workers and the other concerns the number of beneficiaries from disability insurance. Putting aside employment policy considerations, the difference between these two numbers comes from the difficulty to sort out truly disabled workers in a world of asymmetric information. 3 We are abstracting from a number of problems pertaining to disability and insurance. We do so to focus on the issue at hand, namely, the optimal social insurance policy that either a welfarist or a paternalistic planner ought to conduct when disabled and leisure-prone individuals can be sorted out only by resorting to testing. Among the issues ignored, let us mention the fact that health and disability may rather be continuous variables that evolves over the lifecycle. In addition, future research may also want to deal with the plain reality of errors in testing, heterogeneity of wages, and variable labor supply. We mention theses issues as we proceed, as well as papers where they are treated. To put it another way, introducing those important features such as errors in testing, loose screening, evolving health status, etc., would make our model intractable. Furthermore it would distract us from our main objective, which is to discuss the issue of indistinguishability between types and to analyze how to cope with it from a normative and a policy viewpoint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. In sections 3 and 4, we derive respectively the optimal policies from the viewpoint of the welfarist and of the paternalistic social planner. Section 5 concludes.
3 Among recent contributions on disability let us mention that by Autor and Duggan (2006) , who document and discuss the declining effectiveness of the screening process used to distinguish meritorious from non-meritorious disability insurance claims in the US. There is also the interesting study by Benitez-Siva et al. (2004) , who show the gap between selfreported disability and objective indicators of disability. These two contributions effectively document the complexity of the problem at hand and show why all dimensions cannot be taken into account at the same time. A false report is clearly not always due to cheating; it can be the result of misperception. Furthermore the very definition of disability appears to evolve over time.
A Simple Model of Disability Insurance

Preferences and types of individuals
The setting is inspired by Cremer et al. (2004a,b) . Consider an individual with productivity w, dividing his lifetime with duration normalized to one into a period of full activity and a period of retirement. Assume away any liquidity constraint, and posit zero rate of interest and time discount rate. The budget constraint is then given by:
where c (t) is instantaneous consumption, and z (z ≤ 1) is the age of retirement. Lifetime utility is defined as
where u (·) is a strictly concave instantaneous utility functions, while r (t) denotes an increasing function of effort disutility. As will be clarified below, r (t) can be viewed as a mixture of taste for retirement leisure and of physical and mental inability to work further years. We assume that r (t) varies across individuals and increases over the lifetime. Under these assumptions, the utility function and the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
and c = wz,
In other words, consumption is perfectly smoothed over time. We use this reduced form for utility and budget constraint throughout the paper. Three types of individuals are indexed i = H, L, D (for hard-working, leisure-prone and disabled). We assume
which from (1) also implies R H (z) < R L (z) = R D (z). Individuals of type H are hard-working or healthy; they have a low disutility of labor. 4 Type D and L have the same high disutility of labor, which is higher than that for type H. They thus have the same preferences over consumption and leisure. However, they differ in their "health status". Specifically, we think of type D as truly disabled, for whom the high disutility of labor is due to a poor health. Individuals of type L, on the other hand, are in good health but are leisure-prone (or "lazy"). Formally, one can thus think of the health status as a second dimension of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is not reflected in the individuals preferences over consumption and length of activity. However, it determines the preferences of the social planner, who roughly speaking will want to help the disabled but not the lazy individuals; see below for further discussion.
Observe that (2) can also be written as
which can be interpreted as a single-crossing property. For any bundle in the (z, c) space, L and D type individuals have steeper indifference curves than H type individuals.
Policy
We now introduce the possibility of a disability/retirement insurance scheme consisting of a payroll tax τ and a pension benefit function b (z) that depends on the retirement age, z. This tax-transfer scheme [τ, b (z)] encompasses both disability and retirement insurance programs. For simplicity, we often refer to this as "social insurance". It can be represented by a non-linear tax function
Differentiating T (z) with respect to z yields the marginal tax on postponed work that underlies the retirement insurance program
This expression shows the cost of delaying retirement, given by τw, the payroll tax plus b (z), the foregone pension, minus the increase in benefit [b 0 (z)], if any, over the length of retirement (1 − z). We refer to a social insurance program as "actuarially neutral" at the margin if T 0 (z) = 0.
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For future reference, note that a consumer's problem under a non-linear function T (z) can be written as
From the first-order condition, we then obtain
In words, a non-zero marginal tax implies a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption and the marginal productivity of labor; it means that the pension system is not actuarially neutral at the margin. This relationship is important for the interpretation of our results below.
3 Indistinguishable Types with Different Social Weights.
By assumption, D and L have the same disutility function:
Rather than consider those two types as identical, however, the social planner wants to help the disabled workers but not the leisure-prone ones. More precisely, the high disutility for prolonged work is considered as "legitimate" for the disabled but not for the lazy individuals. 6 One way of introducing such a distinction is to assume a weighted social welfare function with lower weights on type L than on type D. This leaves open the issue of which weight to attach to H. To keep things simple, we introduce welfare weights
A possible justification for this choice is to think that 5 We use the term "actuarial neutrality" (or fairness) regarding retirement. This has to be distinguished from marginal or from average fairness regarding the return from saving, namely, the relation between contribution and benefit. On this see Crawford and Lilien (1981) and . 6 The assumption that R L (z) = R D (z) is not important for our analysis. It is made for simplicity because it yields crisper results in some cases. The crucial feature of our model is that the two types are treated differently in the social welfare function. See also footnote 8 below.
a majority of people ex ante do not know whether they are H or D. They maximize their expected utility with some limited concern for a minority of leisure-prone workers who will never be disabled. An alternative approach with paternalistic rather than Paretian social preferences is considered in Section 4, where the disutility for the lazy type L is evaluated using R H rather than R L .
Full information optimum and laissez-faire
Denoting the proportion of type i individuals as p i , the first-best problem is given by:
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. This gives the social efficiency conditions:
which, not surprisingly, are equivalent to (5) with T 0 (z) = 0. With objective (6) the social optimum is Pareto efficient, and we have the usual first-best trade-offs. We also have:
Expressions (7) and (8) together with the assumption ϕ L < ϕ D = ϕ H imply the following ranking of consumption levels and retirement ages:
With this specification type D 's individuals end up retiring earlier than the two other ones. They consume as much as H and more than L. In other words they are compensated for their disability not only by retiring earlier but also by receiving higher benefits (which is conceivable in a social insurance setting).
The laissez-faire solution does not depend on the social objective. Individual tradeoffs are the same as in the first-best and given by equations (7). These conditions, along with the budget constraints,
Observe that to decentralize the full information solution, one simply needs lump-sum transfers from H and L to D, and between H and L (the direction depending on the weights). The retirement choice does not have to be distorted. This is because the weighted objective function necessarily yields a Pareto-efficient solution so that the second welfare theorem applies.
Unobservable types: second-best solution
Let us now turn to the second-best problem, where types are not observable. With three types, we then have to add six incentive compatibility constraints.
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In particular, we have
for type L and
and combining (10) and (9) yields, not surprisingly:
In words, because D and L have the same preferences over c and z, their utility levels must be equalized at any incentive-compatible allocation. The simplest way to achieve (11) is of course to offer the same consumption bundle to the two types: c L = c D and consequently z L = z D . As will become clear below, this is effectively optimal even when it is not a priori imposed.
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When types D and L are pooled, the problem of the social planner is
where we use the subscript L for both L and D's choices of z and c. The FOC with respect to z H and c H yield the traditional no distortion at the top: the marginal rate of substitution of type H continues to be given by (7). The FOC with respect to
7 Each type can potentially mimick either of the two other types. 8 It is optimal when any bundles (c L , z L ) and (c D , z D ) satisfying (11) are permitted. We do not prove this property here because the easiest proof makes use of the FOC derived in the next subsection; see Remark 1 in Appendix A1. Observe that such a pooling may also arise when D and L do not have identical preferences.
where the single-crossing property
. Consequently, we have a downward distortion and a positive marginal tax on z L = z D . We have a rather standard optimal tax problem. A distortion on z is here only justified by incentive arguments. Per our assumptions on preferences, a downward distortion is called for to relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint.
Second-best with auditing
It is pretty clear that the lack of observability of the health status can be quite costly in terms of welfare. It is particularly detrimental to the disabled workers. Because they are pooled with the leisure-prone ones they are forced to work longer and receive less benefits than they would otherwise in a world of perfect observability.
To improve upon this second-best solution, one has to find ways to distinguish types L and D. A traditional way to achieve this is to use disability evaluations.
To study the implication of such a policy, we adopt a very simple form of audit that perfectly reveals an individual's "health status".
9 More precisely, the audit indicates whether or not an individual is of type D. In particular, it can be used to distinguish between D and L individuals. Observe that the audit also reveals mimicking between H and D, but not between H and L (who are both in good health). When a fraction π of type D's claims are subject to testing, the corresponding audit cost is given by k(p D π). An individual who is caught cheating is subject to a sanction that reduces his utility to some exogenous and "low" utility level of ū. This corresponds to the utility level achieved if the individual is subject to some maximum penalty. The literature on crime and punishment initiated by Becker (1968) and subsequently the literature on auditing (and specifically on tax evasion) identifies a trade-off between the level of the sanction and the frequency of controls and finds that it is cheaper to raise the penalty rather than spend on control. Consequently, a corner solution implies that the fine should be set at its maximum level.
10 This is the famous "principle of maximum deterrence". A number of reasons have been introduced to explain why penalties are bounded and why the sanction is thus restricted not to exceed a certain level.
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With these assumptions, we have to modify the revenue constraint of the government
and consider the following six incentive compatibility relations:
The properties of the solution will of course depend on which of the incentive constraints are binding at the optimum. With six incentive constraints, the number of potential combinations of binding incentive constraints is quite large. To reduce the number of cases, we shall make some rather plausible assumptions. First, we assume that the weights are such that the "upwards" constraints (DH) and (LH) are not binding. With ϕ D = ϕ H > ϕ L , it is clear that (LH) can potentially be binding when the weight on L becomes very small. We assume that this is not the case. Second, we restrict our attention to settings where (LD) is binding. This, in turn, immediately implies that (DL) is not binding (as long as π > 0). The Lagrangian expression associated with the problem of the social planner is then given by:
The FOC are provided in Appendix A1; they can be rearranged as follows:
In the Appendix A2, we use these first-order-conditions to derive the following lemma, which further reduces the number of regimes to be considered.
Lemma 1 A solution with λ HD > 0 and λ HL = 0 is not possible.
Lemma 1 along with the assumptions made above imply that we are left with the following three regimes.
Regime Binding incentive constraints
The numerical illustrations provided in the next subsection show that each of these three regimes can effectively occur. From the fist-order-conditions, we then obtain the following results for the different types of individuals.
Type H Whatever the regime, we have from (13) that the marginal tax on z is zero for the type H individuals. This is the usual no distortion at the top result, and it arises because no incentive constraint towards these individuals is binding.
Type L We obtain from (14) that the type L individual is subject to a downward distortion on his choice of retirement if (and only if) λ HL > 0, that is in Regimes 1 and 2.
Type D Using (15), we see that a distortion in the choice of z may or may not arise for the type D, depending on λ HD . When λ HD > 0, z D is subject to a downward distortion, which does not come as a surprise. This occurs in Regime 1 only. In the two other regimes where λ HD = 0, individuals of type D are not subject to distortion. This may appear surprising at first, because the (LD) incentive constraint towards D is binding. However, since D and L have the same indifference curves, a distortion would not be an effective way to relax this incentive constraint.
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An interesting question is whether the introduction of audit makes the lazy retire later than the disabled? The answer depends on the regime. In Regime 3, neither type D or L are subject to distortions. Since type D workers are on a higher indifference curve, we unambiguously have z L > z D . Regime 2 has an implicit tax on z L , but the disabled receive a higher transfer than the lazy. These transfers have an effect that fosters early retirement, so that the comparison between z L and z D is ambiguous. In Regime 1 where the comparison between z D and z L seems ambiguous (both being distorted downwards), we can rank them unambiguously. To see this, we write (HL) , (LD) and (HD) as equalities and combine them, yielding:
The LHS of this expression is the utility differential between H and L, at L 's consumption bundle. It shows the rent that must be conceded to H to prevent mimicking of L. The RHS is also a utility differential between H and L, but at D's consumption bundle. This shows the extra rent H must be granted compared to L at a solution where both types are prevented from mimicking D. This second rent is weighted by the probability of not being detected by the audit, since types H and L are subject to audit when mimicking type D. Not surprisingly, when (HL) , (LD) and (HD) are binding, the two rents in (16) are equalized. Since these two rents are increasing in z by convexity of R (.), we have z D > z L . Consequently, in Regime 1, we do have the perverse result that disabled individuals retire later than the lazy ones. All these results are valid for any arbitrary level of the audit probability (0 < π < 1). 13 To determine the optimal level of π, we have to use the first-order condition (A7). It shows that the determination of π involves a trade-off between costs (μp D k 0 ) and benefits that stem from less stringent IC
To be more precise, the mimicked individual would be hurt as much as the mimicker. Consequently, a distortion cannot be welfare-improving.
13 Consequently, they also apply when the audit probability is exogenously given (rather than set at its optimal level).
constraints and which in turn depends on the utility gap between truthtelling and being caught (second and third terms of (A7)). Quite evidently, one can expect that higher audit costs will reduce π. This is confirmed in the numerical examples below.
14 Conversely, lower audit costs will raise π. Note, however, that auditing with probability one (π = 1) is never optimal. This is a standard result in auditing models. It directly follows from (A7) by observing that when π = 1, (LD) and (HD) are satisfied with strict inequality, so we would have λ LD = λ HD = 0, which would imply that the derivative is negative. This makes sense; when incentive constraints are satisfied with strict inequality, they continue to be satisfied when audit probability (and hence audit cost) is slightly reduced.
Not much can be said analytically about the factors explaining the occurrence of one regime rather than another. However, it is clear that π, which in turn is determined by audit costs, will play a crucial role. In particular, when π is high enough, Regime 1 cannot occur. To see this, suppose that (LD) and (HL) bind. Using the expressions for the incentive constraints, it follows that (HD) is not binding when
which necessarily holds when π is close to one. We now turn to a numerical illustration. The advantage of this simulation exercise is that it yields crisper results. Most significantly, we can determine exactly what pattern of binding incentive constraints emerges.
Illustration
The functional form we use is given by: 
We consider three audit technologies that differ in terms of cost: audit 1 is relatively expensive (k (π) = 2000π
2 ) and implies π = 0.04, λ HL > 0, λ LD > 0 and λ HD > 0 (Regime 1); audit 2 is cheaper (k (π) = 1000π
2 ) and implies π = 0.08 with λ HL > 0, and λ LD > 0 (Regime 2).
15 Finally, audit 3 is the cheapest (k (π) = 100π
2 ) and implies π = 0.33 (and Regime 3). In all cases, u = 0. The results are given in Table 1 .
To interpret these results let us examine how audit costs affect the solution. We start from the no auditing pooling solution, in which types D and L have the same labor supply, consumption and utility. Introducing audit 1 leads to Regime 1 where all three incentive compatibility constraints are binding. Type D and L are now separated, with D enjoying a higher utility level. 16 In other words, audits enable policy makers to help the disabled. The result is strengthened as audits become less expensive. The less expensive technology 2 yields a higher level of audit and implies a regime where (HD) no longer binds so that the utility level of D can be further enhanced. This illustrates the argument we made on the basis of (17), namely that when audit costs are sufficiently small, incentive constraint (HD) no longer binds. For even smaller audit costs, we obtain Regime 3. Observe, however, that if the audit technology were completely costless, we would have either only (HL) binding if ϕ L is relatively high, or the first best if ϕ L is relatively low.
Furthermore, we observe that in all the second-best solutions, the consumption of D is kept below that of H, whereas in the first-best the two types have the same consumption. Not surprisingly, the difference between c H and c D decreases as the audit probability increases. Furthermore, in the pooling solution we have c D = c L , while with auditing c D > c L holds; as expected the difference between c D and c L increases as audit become cheaper and more intense, and thus allows for a better screening. Finally, in Regime 1, D retires later than L, which is in line with the analytical result obtained above. It is surprising to see that the truly disabled workers end up working later than the leisure-prone ones. The reason for this paradoxical outcome lies in the incentive compatibility constraints that make it more efficient to favor the disabled individuals with consumption rather than with leisure. In the other two regimes, however, we have z D < z L , even though L faces a positive marginal tax in Regime 2, while D's marginal tax is zero. This illustrates the idea that the income effects (transfers to D) can dominate the substitution effects (marginal distortions).
The paternalistic case
We now consider an alternative specification wherein the social planner paternalistically attributes to the lazy workers a disutility R H rather than R L . In other words, he wants them to work more and not to consume less. Once again, we start by considering the full information solution.
Full information solution and decentralization
With the paternalistic approach, the full information problem is given by:
The solution is easily obtained. Both healthy types (namely H and L) are assigned the same retirement age, the disabled individuals retire earlier, and all individuals have the same consumption level:
17 If the first best allocation described in Section 3.1 respects (HL), then the first best allocation is implementable with audits. If it is not (which is the case if ϕ L is high enough) then (HL) would bind with free audit.
The laissez-faire solution does not depend on the social objective and is thus the same as in Subsection 3.1. Consequently it is given by equations (7) with the implication that c D = c L < c H and z D = z L < z H . Decentralizing the first-best, however, is now not as simple as in the non-paternalistic specification. Lump sum transfers are not sufficient; one also needs a subsidy (negative marginal tax) on the labor supply of type L individuals. To see this, note that the decentralized choice of z L is determined by:
which coincides with the socially optimal one
when the marginal tax rate is given by
so that we effectively have a subsidy. In words, the rate of subsidy is equal to the difference between "private" and the "social" marginal valuation for z L (evaluated at the optimal allocation). Paternalism introduces a wedge between private and social valuation of type L's labor supply, and the decentralization of the optimum requires a "Pigouvian" subsidy. Naturally this does not imply a negative average tax for type L. As a matter of fact, the leisure-prone individual is necessarily a net tax contributor; this follows directly from (18).
Unobservable types: second-best solution
Let us now turn to the second-best problem, where types are not observable. With three types, we then have to consider six incentive constraints. As in Section 3, we start with the no-audit case, for which one can show that only (HL) , (HD) and the equality constraint given by (11) can possibly be binding. 18 Clearly, when (HD) is binding together with (HL) and (11), one has a pooling optimum. The program is now:
where λ LD ≶ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (11). 19 The firste order conditions with respect to z H and c H yield the traditional no distortion at the top result: the marginal rate of substitution of type H continues to be given by (7). The FOC with respect to c L , c D , z L and z D are:
This yields:
where the sign of (p L − λ HL ) appears to be ambiguous. Furthermore we have
so that we necessarily have a downward distortion for type D's choice of z.
The new feature which arises here is that D and L are no longer necessarily pooled even with no audit. More precisely, we have the following lemma (that is established in Appendix A3):
Lemma 2 The optimum pools D and L if and only if
19 Instead of imposing equality constraint (11), one can impose the two inequality constraints (9) and (10) with the associated Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λ LD ≥ 0 and λ DL ≥ 0. The two problems are equivalent and we have e λ DL = λ LD − λ DL ≶ 0.
To interpret this result, consider equation (26). The distortion on z L is of ambiguous sign. When p L > λ HL , the RHS of (26) is larger than w, so that we have an upward distortion on labor supply (a negative marginal tax rate). Conversely, p L < λ HL yields a downward distortion and thus a positive marginal tax. To understand the role played by this term, note that the distortion in type L's labor supply is determined by balancing two conflicting objectives. First, the standard (Mirrlees-type) incentive effect calls for a downward distortion (positive marginal tax) on L's labor supply in order to relax the incentive constraint from type H to type L. The significance of this effect depends on λ HL , the Lagrange multiplier of this incentive constraint. Second, a "paternalistic" effect calls for an increase in type L's labor supply compared to the laissez-faire level. Recall that social disutility of their labor is smaller than their private disutility. This pleads in favor of an upward distortion (a negative marginal tax). This effect becomes more significant with a larger proportion of group L in the economy. When p L is large enough, the paternalistic consideration is dominant, implying a marginal subsidy on z L . This case provides no reason to pool individuals L and D, because of no need for distortion on z D . However, when p L is small, incentive considerations dominate, which call for a marginal tax on z L . In this case, one necessarily pools individuals L and D in order to prevent individuals H from mimicking individuals D.
To sum up, when p L is large enough, the optimum entails separation between type D and L individuals. This case implies no distortion on z D and a marginal subsidy on z L . When p L is small, one has a pooling optimum with a marginal tax on z L and z D . Note, finally, that the separating optimum necessarily has z L > z D .
Second-best with audit in the paternalistic case
Introduce audits as in Section 3, while continuing to assume that the upwards constraints (LH) and (DH) are not binding. The social planner problem can now be written as the maximization of:
The FOC are stated in Appendix A4. Combining and rearranging these conditions yields the following expressions for the marginal rates of substitution of the different types:
Before commenting on these expressions, it is necessary to determine the possible regimes. To reduce the number of cases, we can first note that Lemma 1 continues to hold in this alternative specification. 20 Next, Appendix A5 provides a sequence of additional Lemmas showing that in the paternalistic case, only two regimes are possible and are given by:
Consequently, it turns out that Regime 3, where only (LD) was binding cannot arise here. Let us now turn to the interpretation of conditions (28)- (30), while taking into account that in both possible regimes (DL) is not binding, so that λ DL = 0. Equation (28) is the usual no distortion at the top property. Turning to (29), observe that the sign of (p L − λ HL ) is ambiguous. As in the preceding section, when p L > λ HL , paternalistic considerations are dominant and call for a marginal subsidy on z L . When p L < λ HL , incentive considerations dominate, and a positive marginal tax on z L is optimal. Comparing to equation (26) also shows that the formal expression for the optimal distortion to the retirement decision of the leisure-prone individuals is the same in the cases with and without audit.
For the interpretation of (30), on the other hand, we have to distinguish Regime 2 with λ HD = 0 from Regime 1 with λ HD > 0. The results are exactly the same as in Section 3, with (30) and its counterpart (15) taking formally the same expression. Regime 2, with λ HD = 0, has no distortion in the choice of retirement for the truly disabled. The mimicking individual L has the same indifference curves as individual D. Consequently, a distortion cannot be created that hurts the mimicker more than the mimicked. Put differently, a distortion is not an effective way to relax the incentive constraint. Consequently, the retirement choice of type D is treated at the margin exactly like that of the type H individual (zero marginal tax). In Regime 1, on the other hand, we have λ HD > 0, implying a distortion towards earlier retirement. This distortion relaxes the incentive constraint (HD). As in Section 3, this distortion is likely to be effective for a relatively low probability of auditing.
The comparison between z L and z D is the same as in Section 3. Note, however, that Regime 1 cannot occur when a marginal subsidy is given to z L . To see this, recall that Regime 1 implies a distortion on z D , and z L < z D . Since D is on a higher indifference curve, this is incompatible with a marginal subsidy on z L . We summarize this in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 When p L > λ HL , Regime 1 cannot occur. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the problem with auditing. In this figure, we have three points in the (wz, c) space. The consumption bundle for individuals of type H is represented by h, where the slope of the indifference curve is 1. The vertical distance between h and the (no tax) budget line c = wz is the transfer individuals of type H have to pay. Point is the solution for individuals of type L who have a budget with slope different from 1. We have represented the case where the slope is higher than 1, but it could have been less. Here, individuals L are subject to a marginal subsidy and receive a transfer. Note the binding incentive constraint from H to L and the relative slope at for these two types of indifference curves. as for individuals H); they receive a larger transfer than individuals of type L. They also work less (d is to the left of ). Note, however, that with a positive marginal tax on L and a weak income effect, it is not impossible to have z D > z L in the second best (recall that it is always the case in Regime 1). Finally, the indifference curve going through represents the consumption bundles yielding an expected utility that corresponds to a linear combination of the utility associated with d and the utility level u. Equation (A16) determines the optimal value of π, which depends on both k, the cost of auditing, and ū, the penalty. Not surprisingly, the optimal audit probability (for type D claims) is determined by the trade-off between its negative effect on public expenditures (−μp D k 0 ) and its positive effect via the welfare gain stemming from less stringent incentive constraints. 
An illustration for the paternalistic objective function
We use the same utility function as in Section 3 and continue to assume u = 0. However, in order to illustrate both the pooling and the separating optima, we consider the two following scenarios for parameter values:
1 4 4 1 4 4 p i 0.6 0.07 0.33 0.6 0.2 0.2 w i 100 100 100 100 100 100
These two scenarios differ in the proportion of type L and D in the economy. Scenario 1, has a small proportion of type L individuals, while this proportion is larger in Scenario 2. In addition, we consider two audit technologies that differ by their cost: Audit 1 is relatively expensive (k (π) = 5000π
2 ) , while Audit 2 is cheaper (k (π) = 1000π
2 ). The results are given in Table 2 (Scenario 1) and Table 3 (Scenario 3) .
Not surprisingly, Audit 1 implies lower audit probabilities than Audit 2. In Scenario 1, p L is relatively low, so without audit, a pooling optimum occurs with positive marginal taxes on z L and z D . As in the case of the Paretian 
objective, an increase in audits means moving from Regime 1 to 2. In Regime 1, lazy individuals work less than the disabled, while in Regime 2 they work more. In Scenario 2, the optimum without audit involves separation between individuals D and L, because p L is now relatively high and paternalistic considerations dominate. In this case, the second best with and without audit involve no distortion on z D , while a marginal subsidy is given to z L . It is particularly interesting to study the solution for z D and z L . With a paternalistic objective that attributes the leisure-prone individuals the same low disutility for effort as that of the hard-working individuals, we expect z D < z L in the second-best with audit. However, this is not always the case. With costly audit (π = 0.01) and in regime 1, it is interesting to see that z D > z L . Recall that we did have the same result with the welfarist objective. The reason is that we have to satisfy not only HL and LD but also HD. With this additional self-selection constraint, favoring D in terms of consumption rather than retirement happens to be more efficient. When audit is cheaper, or with scenario 2, then z D > z L . But this was already the case even without audit, as Table 3 shows well.
Conclusion
We have studied the design of retirement and disability benefits in a setting with three types of individuals. Healthy individuals have a low disutility of labor. The two other types have identical preferences with a high disutility of labor. However, they differ in their (unobservable) health status. Type L individuals have a high disutility for labor because they are leisure-prone. Type D individuals, on the other hand, have a high disutility because they are disabled. We start from the premise that policy makers are not prepared to treat types D and L alike. Helping type D individuals and allowing them to retire early with "generous" benefits is considered to be a legitimate policy goal. However, society does not want to extend such a generous treatment to the L type individuals. Formally, this is introduced by considering either a (Paretian) social welfare function, which puts less weight on the type L individuals, or by using a paternalistic social welfare function that does not fully account for the type L individuals' disutility of labor.
In either setting, a first-best solution would imply earlier retirement for D than for L (z D < z L ). However, when the health status is not observable, it may or may not be possible to separate the two types, so that the second-best may imply z D = z L . In that case, the effectiveness of disability benefits is severely undermined by the presence of the L type, and the possibilities to help the disabled are limited. The situation can be improved if costly audits become available (such as tests for disability). However, the second-best with audit does not necessarily imply z D < z L ; quite surprisingly, we may even end up with a situation where the disabled retire later than the lazy (z D > z L ). But their consumption or rather their disability benefits are higher than those of workers of type L. Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the optimum often implies distorted retirement decision at least for types L and D. However, situations arise with no distortion, even in the second best, or where the distortions affect only one of the types. We show that this depends on the pattern of binding incentive constraints that depend on the cost of the audit.
The contrast between the two specifications of the social objective, paternalistic or welfarist, is much sharper in the first-best than in the second-best with audits. In the first-best the paternalistic planner can make the leisureprone individuals work as long as the healthy individuals, while the disabled individuals retire much earlier; the welfarist planner instead uses both consumption and retirement to discriminate between the two types. In the secondbest, particularly when audit is costly, the self-selection constraints restrict the possibilities to differentiate individuals in terms of retirement age. As the nu-merical example shows, not only the welfarist but also the paternalistic social planner ends up with a retirement age for the disabled worker that is higher than that of the leisure-prone worker.
To put these results in perspective, it is interesting to consider the policy implications of the NBER and OECD studies. 21 These authors consider disability as one of the exit routes to retirement and point out that not all workers using that route are truly disabled. They conclude that to mitigate this type of "abuse", and to ensure financial viability, social insurance programs should be made more neutral towards retirement decisions. However, for those who are truly disabled, particularly at an early age, the welfare loss of such reforms can be severe. In this paper we show that to avoid such an outcome, one should introduce or strengthen the audit and control techniques that allow policy to sort out leisure-prone workers from true disabled individuals. In this way, it may be possible to keep the disability benefits at a sufficient high level while inducing the non-disabled to work longer. Finally, while we have focused on disability insurance, the same approach could be used to deal with unemployment insurance.
Remark 1 From these first-order conditions we can easily obtain those for the case where π = 0, that is, with no audit, but we do not a priori impose pooling between L and D. For this it is sufficient to replace λ LD by e λ LD , the Lagrange multiplier associated with (11). These first-order conditions can be used to show that with π = 0, pooling is unavoidable. To see this, recall that without audit, L and D are on the same indifference curve. A simple graphical argument shows that we have λ HL > 0 and λ HD = 0 when z L > z D , while we have λ HD > 0 and λ HL = 0 when z D > z L . However, when λ HL > 0 and λ HD = 0, we have from (14)- (15) that z L is distorted downwards, while z D is not distorted. But having both types on the same indifference curve implies z D > z L , and we have a contradiction. The case where λ HD > 0 and λ HL = 0 can be dealt with along the same lines.
A2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume λ HD > 0 and λ HL = 0.
We then have
Using (HD) , (HL) holds with strict inequality if:
Using (LD), a necessary condition for (A9) to hold is: 
we have that D is on a higher (or the same) indifference curve than L, which implies that the income effect reinforces the substitution effect (assuming that leisure is normal). To sum up, we obtain a contradiction.
A3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. 
has no (first order) effect on individual D's utility. Furthermore, this variation does not affect incentive constraints (LD) and (HL). However, it relaxes (HD) and the budget constraint. This contradicts the fact that we have an optimum.
A4 First-order conditions for L 2
Differentiating L 2 yields the following FOC: 
Using (HL) and (HD) , (LD) holds with strict inequality if
Thus, since R 0 L (z D ) /u 0 (c D ) < w by (30), one necessarily has λ HL > p L . It implies ∂L 2 /∂c L < 0 since λ LD = 0. This contradicts the fact that we have an interior optimum.
Lemma 6 A solution with λ DL > 0 is impossible.
Proof. The result follows directly from the combination of Lemma 4 and 5.
Lemma 7 A solution with λ LD > 0 and λ HD = λ HL = 0 is not possible.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume λ HD = λ HL = 0 and λ LD > 0.
First note that because λ LD > 0, one has λ DL = 0. Using (A10) and (A12), we have
which implies c L > c H . By the same way, combining (A11) and (A13), we obtain
which implies z L < z H . This contradicts (HL).
Lemma 8 A solution with λ HL > 0 and λ HD = λ LD = 0 is not possible.
Proof. If it were the case, we would have ∂L 2 /∂π < 0 which would contradict π > 0.
